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Abstract
We study two-player zero-sum stopping games in continuous time
and infinite horizon. We prove that the value in randomized stopping
times exists as soon as the payoff processes are right-continuous. In
particular, as opposed to existing literature, we do not assume any
conditions on the relations between the payoff processes. We also show
that both players have simple ε-optimal randomized stopping times;
namely, randomized stopping times which are small perturbations of
non-randomized stopping times.
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1 Introduction
Stopping games in discrete time were introduced by Dynkin (1969) as a vari-
ation of optimal stopping problems. In Dynkin’s (1969) setup, two players
observe the realization of two discrete time processes (xt, rt)t∈N. Player 1
chooses a stopping time µ such that {µ = t} ⊆ {rt ≥ 0} for every t ∈N, and
player 2 chooses a stopping time ν such that {ν = t} ⊆ {rt < 0} for every
t ∈ N. Thus, players are not allowed to stop simultaneously. Player 2 then
pays player 1 the amount xmin{µ,ν}1min{µ,ν}<+∞, where 1 is the indicator
function. This amount is a random variable. Denote the expected payoff
player 1 receives by
γ(µ, ν) = E[xmin{µ,ν}1min{µ,ν}<+∞].
Dynkin (1969) proved that the game admits a value; that is,
sup
µ
inf
ν
γ(µ, ν) = inf
ν
sup
µ
γ(µ, ν).
Since then many authors generalized this basic result, both in discrete
time and in continuous time.
In discrete time, Neveu (1975) allows the players to stop simultane-
ously, that is, he introduces three uniformly integrable adapted processes
(at, bt, ct)t∈N, the two players choose stopping times µ and ν respectively,
and the payoff player 2 pays player 1 is
aµ1{µ<ν} + bν1{µ>ν} + cµ1{µ=ν<+∞}.
Neveu (1975) provides sufficient conditions for the existence of the value.
One of the conditions he imposes is the following:
• Condition C: ct = at ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0.
It is well known that in general the value need not exist when condi-
tion C is not satisfied. Rosenberg et al. (2001) allow the players to choose
randomized stopping times, and they prove, in discrete time again, the ex-
istence of the value in randomized stopping times. This result was recently
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generalized by Shmaya and Solan (2002) to the existence of an ε-equilibrium
in the non-zero-sum problem.
Several authors, including Bismut (1979), Alario-Nazaret et al. (1982)
and Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984) studied the problem in continuous
time. That is, the processes (at, bt, ct)t≥0 are in continuous time, and the
stopping times the players choose are [0,+∞]-valued. The literature pro-
vides sufficient conditions, that include condition C, for the existence of the
value in pure (i.e. non-randomized) stopping times.
Touzi and Vieille (2002) study the problem in continuous time, without
condition C, played on a bounded interval [0, T ]; that is, players must stop
before or at time T . They prove that if (at)t≥0 and (bt)t≥0 are semimartin-
gales continuous at T , and if ct ≤ bt for every t ∈ [0, T ], then the game
admits a value in randomized stopping times.
In the present paper we prove that every stopping game in continuous
time where (at)t≥0 and (bt)t≥0 are right-continuous, and (ct)t≥0 is progres-
sively measurable, admits a value in randomized stopping times. In addition,
we construct ε-optimal strategies which are as close as one wishes to pure
(non-randomized) stopping times; roughly speaking, there is a stopping time
µ such that for every δ sufficiently small there is an ε-optimal strategy that
stops with probability 1 between times µ and µ+δ. Finally, we construct an
ε-optimal strategy in the spirit of Dynkin (1969) and we extend the model
by introducing cumulative payoffs and final payoffs.
Stopping games in continuous time were applied in various contexts. The
one player stopping problem (the Snell envelope) is used in finance for the
pricing of the American option, see, e.g., Bensoussan (1984) and Karatzas
(1988). More recently Cvitanic and Karatzas (1996) used stopping games
for the study of backward stochastic differential equation with reflecting
barriers, and Ma and Cvitanic (2001) for the pricing of “the American game
option”. Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) used stopping games to study
strategic exit from a shrinking market.
3
2 Model, literature and main result
A two-player zero-sum stopping game in continuous time Γ is given by:
• A probability space (Ω,A, P ): (Ω,A) is a measurable space and P is
a σ-additive probability measure on (Ω,A) .
• A filtration in continuous time F = (Ft)t≥0 satisfying “the usual con-
ditions”. That is, F is right-continuous, and F0 contains all P -null
sets: for every B ∈ A with P (B) = 0 and every A ⊂ B, one has
A ∈ F0.
Denote F∞ := ∨t≥0Ft. Assume without loss of generality that F∞ =
A. Hence (Ω,A, P ) is a complete probability space.
• Three uniformly bounded F-adapted processes (at, bt, ct)t≥0.
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A pure strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) is a F-adapted stopping time
µ (resp. ν). We allow players to never stop, by choosing µ (or ν) to be equal
to +∞.
The game proceeds as follows. Player 1 chooses a pure strategy µ, and
player 2 chooses simultaneously and independently a pure strategy ν. Player
2 then pays player 1 the amount aµ1{µ<ν}+bν1{µ>ν}+cµ1{µ=ν<+∞}, which
is a random variable. The expected payoff that correspond to a pair of pure
strategies (µ, ν) is
γ(µ, ν) = EP [aµ1{µ<ν} + bν1{µ>ν} + cµ1{µ=ν<+∞}].
Thus, if the game never stops, the payoff is 0. This could be relaxed by
adding to the payoff a final payoff χ1µ=ν=+∞, where χ is some A-measurable
function; see Section 4. For a given stopping game Γ we denote the expected
payoff by γΓ(µ, ν) when we want to emphasize the dependency of the ex-
pected payoff on the game.
1As we argue below (see Section 2.1) our results hold for a larger class of payoff pro-
cesses, that contains the class of uniformly integrable payoff processes.
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The quantity supµ infν γ(µ, ν) is the maximal amount that player 1 can
guarantee to receive; that is, the best he can get (in expectation) if player
2 knows the strategy chosen by player 1 before he has to choose his own
strategy. Similarly, by playing properly, player 2 can guarantee to pay no
more than infν supµ γ(µ, ν).
Definition 1 If supµ infν γ(µ, ν) = infν supµ γ(µ, ν) then the common value
is the value in pure strategies of the game, and is denoted by v. Any strategy
µ for which infν γ(µ, ν) is within ε of v is an ε-optimal strategy of player 1.
ε-optimal strategies of player 2 are defined analogously.
Many authors provided sufficient conditions for the existence of the value
in pure strategies and ε-optimal pure strategies. The most general set of suf-
ficient conditions in continuous time was given by Lepeltier and Maingue-
neau (1984, Corollary 12, Theorems 13 and 15).
Theorem 2 (Lepeltier and Maingueneau, 1984) If (a) the processes
(at, bt)t≥0 are right-continuous, and (b) at = ct ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0, the
value exists and both players have pure ε-optimal strategies.
Remark 1: Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984) require that the pro-
cesses (at, bt)t≥0 are optional; that is, measurable with respect to the op-
tional filtration. Recall that the optional filtration is the one generated by
all RCLL (right-continuous with left limit) processes. Under the “usual con-
ditions” it is also the filtration generated by all right-continuous processes
(see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975, §IV-65).
Laraki (2000, Theorem 9.1) slightly extended this result by requiring
that ct is in the convex hull of at and bt (ct ∈ co{at, bt}) for every t ≥ 0
instead of (b) of Theorem 2.
The pure ε-optimal strategies that exist by Theorem 2 need not be finite.
Indeed, the value of the game that is given by at = ct = −1 and bt = 1 for
every t ≥ 0 is 0, and the only 0-optimal pure strategy of player 1 is µ = +∞.
Moreover, if µ is an ε-optimal pure strategy of player 1 then P (µ < +∞) ≤ ε.
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It is well known that in general the value in pure strategies need not
exist. Indeed, take at = bt = 1 and ct = 0 for every t ≥ 0. Since γ(µ, µ) = 0
it follows that supµ infν γ(µ, ν) = 0. For every stopping time ν define a
stopping time µν by
µν
 0 ν > 01 ν = 0 .
Since γ(µν , ν) = 1 for every ν it follows that infν supµ γ(µ, ν) = 1, and the
value in pure strategies does not exist.
The difficulty with the last example is that player 2, knowing the strategy
of player 1, can stop exactly at the same time as his opponent. The solution
is to allow player 1 to choose his stopping time randomly, thereby making
the probability that the players stop simultaneously vanish. Indeed, in the
last example, if player 1 could have randomly chosen his stopping time, say,
uniformly in the interval [0, 1], then the game terminates before time 1 with
probability 1, and the probability of simultaneous stopping is 0, whatever
player 2 plays. In particular, such a strategy guarantees player 1 payoff 1.
In the game theoretic literature, a standard and natural way to increase
the set of strategies is by allowing players to randomize. A mixed strategy
is a probability distribution over pure strategies. In general, this allows to
convexify the set of strategies, and makes the payoff function bilinear. One
can then apply a standard min-max theorem (e.g., Sion, 1958) to prove the
existence of the value in mixed strategies, provided some regularity condi-
tions hold (e.g., the space of mixed strategies is compact and the payoff
function continuous).
Three equivalent ways to randomize the set of pure strategies in our setup
are discussed in Touzi and Vieille (2002). We adopt the following definition
of mixed strategies due to Aumann (1964). It extends the probability space
to ([0, 1]× [0, 1]×Ω,B × B×A, λ⊗λ⊗P ), where B is the σ-algebra of Borel
sets of [0, 1], and λ is the Lebesgue measure on [0, 1].
Definition 3 A mixed strategy of player 1 is a measurable function φ :
[0, 1]×Ω → [0,+∞] such that for λ-almost every r ∈ [0, 1], µr (ω) := φ(r, ω)
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is a stopping time.
The interpretation is the following: player 1 chooses randomly r ∈ [0, 1],
and then stops the game at time µr = φ(r, ·). Mixed strategies of player
2 are denoted by ψ, and, for every s ∈ [0, 1], the s-section is denoted by
νs := ψ (s, ·).
The expected payoff that corresponds to a pair of mixed strategies (φ,ψ)
is:
γ(φ,ψ) =
∫
[0,1]2
γ(µr, νs) dr ds (1)
= Eλ⊗λ⊗P
[
aµr1{µr<νs} + bνs1{µr>νs} + cµr1{µr=νs<+∞}
]
.
Though the payoff function given by (1) is bilinear, without strong as-
sumptions on the data of the game the payoff function is not continuous for
the same topology which makes the strategy space compact.
Definition 4 If supφ infψ γ(φ,ψ) = infψ supφ γ(φ,ψ) then the common value
is the value in mixed strategies, and it is denoted by V . Every strategy φ
such that infψ γ(φ,ψ) is within ε of V is ε-optimal for player 1. ε-optimal
strategies of player 2 are defined analogously.
Observe that supφ infψ γ(φ,ψ) = supφ infν γ(φ, ν), where ν ranges over
all pure stopping times, and that infψ supφ γ(φ,ψ) = infψ supµ γ(µ,ψ), where
µ ranges over all pure stopping times. Hence, to prove the existence of the
value, it suffices to show that supφ infν γ(φ, ν) = infψ supµ γ(µ,ψ). More-
over, one always has supφ infψ γ(φ,ψ) ≤ infψ supφ γ(φ,ψ).
Existence of the value in mixed strategies in stopping games with contin-
uous time was studied by Touzi and Vieille (2002), who proved the following.
Let ΦT be the space of all mixed strategies φ such that λ⊗P (µr ≤ T ) = 1,
and let ΨT be the space of all mixed strategies ψ such that λ⊗P (νs ≤ T ) = 1.
Theorem 5 (Touzi and Vieille, 2002) For every T > 0, if (a) the pro-
cesses (at, bt)t≥0 are semimartingales with trajectories continuous at time
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T , (b) ct ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0, and (c) the payoff processes are uniformly
integrable, then:
sup
φ∈ΦT
inf
ψ∈ΨT
γ(φ,ψ) = inf
ψ∈ΨT
sup
φ∈ΦT
γ(φ,ψ).
Touzi and Vieille (2002) prove that under conditions (a) and (b) of The-
orem 5 it is sufficient to restrict the players to certain subclasses of mixed
strategies. They then apply Sion’s (1958) min-max theorem to the restricted
game.
Remark 2: By Dellacherie and Meyer (1980, §VII-23), under the “usual
conditions”, a semimartingle is always RCLL (right-continuous with left
limit).
One class of mixed strategies will play a special role along the paper.
Definition 6 Let δ > 0. A mixed strategy φ is δ-almost pure if there exists
a stopping time µ and a set A ∈ Fµ such that for every r ∈ [0, 1], φ(r, ·) = µ
on A, and φ(r, ·) = µ+ rδ on Ac.
Recall that a process (xt)t≥0 is progressively measurable if for every
t ≥ 0 the function (s, ω) 7→ xs(ω) from [0, t]×Ω is measurable with respect
to B([0, t]) × Ft, where B([0, t]) is the σ-algebra of Borel subsets of [0, t].
Recall also that an optional process is progressively measurable (see, e.g.,
Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975, §IV-64).
The main result we present is the following.
Theorem 7 If the processes (at)t≥0 and (bt)t≥0 are right-continuous and if
(ct)t≥0 is progressively measurable then the value in mixed strategies exists.
Moreover, for every ε > 0 there is δ0 ∈ (0, 1) such that for every δ ∈ (0, δ0)
both players have δ-almost pure ε-optimal strategies.
Our proof heavily relies on the result of Lepeltier and Maingueneau
(1984), where they extend the discrete time variational approach of Neveu
(1975) to continuous time.
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2.1 On the payoff processes
A F-adapted process x = (xt)t≥0 is in the class D (see, e.g., Dellacherie and
Meyer, 1980, §VI-20) if the set {xσ1{σ<+∞}, σ is a F-adapted stopping time}
is uniformly integrable (see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975, §II-17). That
is, if for every bounded stopping time σ, EP [|xσ|1{xσ≥r}] converges uniformly
to 0 as r goes to +∞.
This implies that the set {EP [|xσ|1{σ<+∞}], σ is a F-adapted stopping time}
is uniformly bounded (see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975, §II-19). Ob-
serve that every uniformly bounded process, as well as every uniformly in-
tegrable process, is in the class D (see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975,
§II-18)).
For a measurable process (xt)t≥0 and r ≥ 0, define the process (x
r
t )t≥0
by:
xrt (ω) := xt(ω)1{|xt(ω)|≤r} + r1{xt(ω)>r} − r1{xt(ω)<−r}.
By Dellacherie and Meyer (1975, §II-17), x ∈ D if and only if for every
ε > 0 there exists r > 0 such that for every stopping time σ one has
E
[
|xσ − x
r
σ| 1{σ<+∞}
]
< ε. The process (xrt )t≥0 is uniformly bounded by r,
and, in addition, if (xt)t≥0 is right-continuous or F-adapted, so is (x
r
t )t≥0 .
If the payoff processes (at)t≥0, (bt)t≥0 and (ct)t≥0 are not necessarily
bounded but are in the class D, then for every ε > 0 there exists r > 0 such
that
EP
[
(|aσ − a
r
σ|+ |bσ − b
r
σ|+ |cσ − c
r
σ|) 1{σ<+∞}
]
< ε.
Hence, if the game Γ = (Ω,A, P ;F , (at, bt, ct)t≥0) satisfies the assumptions
of Theorem 7, it admits a value. Moreover, every ε-optimal strategy in
Γr := (Ω,A, P ;F , (art , b
r
t , c
r
t )t≥0) is 2ε-optimal in Γ.
In particular, all the existence results that are proved for uniformly
bounded payoff processes (Lepeltier and Maingueneau (1984)) or uniformly
integrable payoff processes (Touzi and Vieille (2002)) are valid for payoff
processes in the class D as well.
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3 Proof
In the present section the main result of the paper is proven. From now
on we fix a stopping game Γ such that (at, bt)t≥0 are right-continuous and
(ct)t≥0 is progressively measurable.
3.1 Preliminaries
The following Lemma will be used in the sequel.
Lemma 8 For every F-adapted stopping time τ and every ε > 0 there is
δ > 0 such that p ({|at − aτ | < ε ∀t ∈ [τ, τ + δ]}) > 1− ε.
A similar statement holds when one replaces the process (at)t≥0 by the
process (bt)t≥0.
Proof. Since (at)t≥0 is right-continuous, it is progressively measurable
(see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975, §IV-15).
Let δτ(ω)(ω) = inf{s ≥ τ(ω) : |as(ω) − aτ (ω)| ≥ ε}. The progressive
measurability of (at)t≥0 implies that δτ(ω)(ω) is measurable with respect to
F∞ (see, e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975, §III-44).
The right-continuity of (at)t≥0 implies that P ({ω : δτ(ω)(ω) > 0}) = 1.
Since P is σ-additive and {ω : δτ(ω)(ω) > 0} = ∪n>0{ω : δτ(ω)(ω) >
1
n
}, the
lemma follows by choosing δ > 0 sufficiently small so that P ({ω : δτ(ω)(ω) >
δ}) > 1− ε.
By Lemma 8, and since the payoff processes are uniformly bounded, one
obtains the following.
Corollary 9 Let a stopping time τ and ε > 0 be given. There exists δ > 0
sufficiently small such that for every Fτ -measurable set A ⊆ {τ < +∞},
and every stopping time µ that satisfies τ ≤ µ ≤ τ + δ,
|EP [aµ1A]−EP [aτ1A]| ≤ 2ε.
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3.2 The case at ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0
Definition 10 Let δ > 0. A mixed strategy φ is δ-pure if there exists a
stopping time µ such that
φ(r, ·) = µ+ rδ ∀r ∈ [0, 1]. (2)
Observe that a δ-pure mixed strategy is in particular δ-almost pure.
When µ is a stopping time, we sometime denote the δ-pure mixed strategy
defined in (2) simply by µ+ rδ.
In this section we prove the following result: when at ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0
the value in mixed strategies exists, it is independent of (ct)t≥0, and both
players have δ-pure ǫ-optimal strategies, provided δ is sufficiently small.
The idea is the following. Assume player 1 decides to stop at time t. If
ct ≤ at, player 1 wants to mask the exact time in which he stops, so that
player 2 cannot stop at the same time. Since payoffs are right-continuous,
he can stop randomly in a small interval after time t. If ct > at, player 2
prefers that player 1 stops alone at time t rather than to stop simultaneously
with player 1 at time t.
Proposition 11 If at ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0 then the value in mixed strategies
exists. Moreover, the value is independent of the process (ct)t≥0, and for
every ε > 0 there is δ0 > 0 such that for every δ ∈ (0, δ0) both players have
δ-pure ε-optimal strategies. If at ≤ ct ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0 then the value in
pure strategies exists, and there are ǫ-optimal strategies that are independent
of (ct)t≥0.
Proof. Consider an auxiliary stopping game Γ∗ = (Ω,A, P ;F , (a∗t , b
∗
t , c
∗
t )t≥0),
where a∗t = at and b
∗
t = c
∗
t = bt for every t ≥ 0.
By Theorem 2 the game Γ∗ has a value in pure strategies v∗. We will
prove that v∗ is the value in mixed strategies of the original game. Since Γ∗
does not depend on the process (ct)t≥0, the second claim in the proposition
will follow.
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Fix ε > 0. Let µ be an ε-optimal strategy of player 1 in Γ∗. In particular,
infν γΓ∗(µ, ν) ≥ v
∗ − ε.
We now construct a mixed strategy φ that satisfies infν γΓ(φ, ν) ≥ v
∗−5ε.
By Lemma 8 there is δ > 0 such that p({|at−aµ| < ε ∀t ∈ [µ, µ+δ]}) > 1−ε.
Define a δ-pure mixed strategy φ by
φ(r, ·) = µ+ rδ ∀r ∈ [0, 1].
Let ν be any stopping time. Since µ is ε-optimal in Γ∗, by the definition
of Γ∗, and since λ⊗ P (µ+ rδ = ν) = 0,
v∗ − ε ≤ γΓ∗(µ, ν)
= EP [aµ1{µ<ν} + bν1{µ≥ν}] (3)
= Eλ⊗P [aµ1{µ+rδ<ν} + aµ1{µ<ν<µ+rδ} + bν1{µ≥ν}].
Since λ⊗ P (µ+ rδ = ν) = 0 and (ct)t≥0 is progressively measurable,
γΓ(φ, ν) = Eλ⊗P
[
aµ+rδ1{µ+rδ<ν} + bν1{µ+rδ>ν} + cν1{µ+rδ=ν<+∞}
]
= Eλ⊗P
[
aµ+rδ1{µ+rδ<ν} + bν1{µ+rδ>ν}
]
(4)
= Eλ⊗P
[
aµ+rδ1{µ+rδ<ν} + bν1{µ<ν<µ+rδ} + bν1{µ≥ν}
]
.
By Corollary 9, and since at ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0,
Eλ⊗P [aµ1{µ<ν<µ+rδ}] ≤ Eλ⊗P [aν1{µ<ν<µ+rδ}]+2ε ≤ Eλ⊗P [bν1{µ<ν<µ+rδ}]+2ε.
(5)
Corollary 9 implies in addition that
Eλ⊗P [aµ1{µ+rδ<ν}] ≤ Eλ⊗P [aµ+rδ1{µ+rδ<ν}] + 2ε. (6)
By (3)-(6),
v∗ − ε ≤ γΓ∗(µ, ν) ≤ γΓ(φ, ν) + 4ε.
Since ν is arbitrary, infν γΓ(φ, ν) ≥ v
∗ − 5ε.
Consider an auxiliary stopping game Γ∗∗ = (Ω,A, P ;F , (a∗∗t , b
∗∗
t , c
∗∗
t )t≥0),
where a∗∗t = c
∗∗
t = at and b
∗∗
t = bt for every t ≥ 0.
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A symmetric argument to the one provided above proves that the game
Γ∗∗ has a value v∗∗, and that player 2 has a mixed strategy ψ which satisfies
supµ γΓ(µ,ψ) ≤ v
∗∗ + 5ε.
Since c∗∗t = at ≤ bt = c
∗
t for every t ≥ 0, v
∗∗ ≤ v∗. Since supµ γΓ(µ,ψ) ≥
γΓ(φ,ψ) ≥ infν γΓ(φ, ν),
v∗ ≥ v∗∗ ≥ sup
µ
γΓ(µ,ψ) − 5ε ≥ inf
ν
γΓ(φ, ν)− 5ε ≥ v
∗ − 10ε.
Since ε is arbitrary, v∗ = v∗∗, so that v∗ is the value in mixed strategies of
Γ, and φ and ψ are 5ε-optimal mixed strategies of the two players.
If at ≤ ct ≤ bt for every t ≥ 0 then γΓ∗∗(µ, ν) ≤ γΓ(µ, ν) ≤ γΓ∗(µ, ν) for
every pair of pure strategies (µ, ν). Hence
v∗∗ = sup
µ
inf
ν
γΓ∗∗(µ, ν) ≤ sup
µ
inf
ν
γΓ(µ, ν)
≤ inf
ν
sup
µ
γΓ(µ, ν) ≤ inf
ν
sup
µ
γΓ∗(µ, ν) = v
∗ = v∗∗.
Thus supµ infν γΓ(µ, ν) = infν supµ γΓ(µ, ν) : the value in pure strategies
exists. Moreover, any ǫ-optimal strategy of player 1 (resp. player 2) in Γ∗
(resp. Γ∗∗) is also ǫ-optimal in Γ. In particular, if at ≤ ct ≤ bt for every
t ≥ 0, both players have ǫ-optimal strategies that are independent of (ct)t≥0.
3.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Define a stopping time τ by
τ = inf{t ≥ 0, at ≥ bt},
where the infimum of an empty set is +∞. Since (at−bt)t≥0 is progressively
measurable with respect to (Ft)t≥0, τ is an F-adapted stopping time (see,
e.g., Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975, §IV-50).
The idea is the following. We show that it is optimal for both players to
stop at or around time τ (provided the game does not stop before time τ).
Hence the problem reduces to the game between times 0 and τ . Since for
t ∈ [0, τ [, at ≤ bt, Proposition 11 can be applied.
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The following notation will be useful in the sequel. For a pair of pure
strategies (µ, ν), and a set A ∈ A, we define
γΓ(µ, ν;A) = EP [1A(aµ1{µ<ν} + bµ1{µ>ν} + cµ1{µ=ν<+∞})].
This is the expected payoff restricted to A. For a pair of mixed strategies
(φ,ψ) we define
γΓ(φ,ψ;A) =
∫
[0,1]2
γΓ(µr, νs;A)dr ds,
where µr and νs are the sections of φ and ψ respectively.
Set
A0 = {τ = +∞},
A1 = {τ < +∞} ∩ {cτ ≥ aτ ≥ bτ},
A2 = {τ < +∞} ∩ {aτ > cτ ≥ bτ}, and
A3 = {τ < +∞} ∩ {aτ ≥ bτ > cτ}.
Observe that (A0, A1, A2, A3) is an Fτ -measurable partition of Ω.
Define a Fτ -measurable function w by
w = aτ1A1 + cτ1A2 + bτ1A3 .
Define a stopping game Γ∗ = (Ω,A, P, (Ft)t≥0, (a
∗
t , b
∗
t , c
∗
t )t≥0) by:
a∗t =
 at t < τw t ≥ τ , b∗t =
 bt t < τw t ≥ τ , c∗t =
 ct t < τw t ≥ τ .
That is, the payoff is set to w at and after time τ .
The game Γ∗ satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 11, hence it has a
value in mixed strategies V . Moreover, for every ε > 0 both players have
δ-pure ε-optimal strategies, provided δ > 0 is sufficiently small.
We now prove that V is the value of the game Γ as well. Fix ε > 0. We
only show that player 1 has a mixed strategy φ such that infν γΓ(φ, ν) ≥
V − 7ε. An analogous argument shows that player 2 has a mixed strategy
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ψ such that supµ γΓ(µ,ψ) ≤ V + 7ε. Since ε is arbitrary, V is indeed the
value in mixed strategies of Γ.
Assume δ is sufficiently small so that the following conditions hold (by
the proofs of Lemma 8 and Proposition 11 such δ exists).
(C1) Player 1 has a δ-pure ε-optimal strategy φ∗ = µ+ rδ in Γ∗.
(C2) P ({µ+ δ < τ}) ≥ P ({µ < τ})− ε/M , where M ∈]0,+∞[ is a uniform
bound of the payoff processes.
(C3) P ({|at − aτ | < ε, |bt − bτ | < ε ∀t ∈ [τ, τ + δ]}) > 1− ε.
We now claim that one can choose µ so that µ ≤ τ . Indeed, assume that
P ({µ > τ}) > 0. The set {µ > τ} is Fτ -measurable. Define a stopping time
µ′ = min{µ, τ}. We will prove that the δ-pure strategy φ′ = µ′ + rδ is also
ε-optimal in Γ∗, which establishes the claim. Given a stopping time ν define
a stopping time ν ′ as follows: ν ′ = τ over {µ > τ}, and ν ′ = ν otherwise.
Then
V − ε ≤ γΓ∗(µ+ rδ, ν
′) = γΓ∗(µ+ rδ, ν
′; {µ > τ}) + γΓ∗(µ+ rδ, ν
′; {µ ≤ τ}).
However, γΓ∗(µ + rδ, ν
′; {µ > τ}) = Eλ⊗P [w1{µ>τ}] = γΓ∗(µ
′ + rδ, ν; {µ >
τ}), and since µ = µ′ and ν = ν ′ over {µ ≤ τ}, γΓ∗(µ + rδ, ν
′; {µ ≤ τ}) =
γΓ∗(µ
′ + rδ, ν; {µ ≤ τ}. Therefore
γΓ∗(µ
′ + rδ, ν) = γΓ∗(µ+ rδ, ν
′) ≥ V − ε.
Since ν is arbitrary, µ′ + rδ is ε-optimal, as desired.
Define a mixed strategy φ as follows.
φ(r, ·) =

µ+ rδ {µ < τ} ∪A0,
τ {µ = τ} ∩ (A1 ∪A2) ,
µ+ rδ {µ = τ} ∩A3.
Observe that φ is δ-almost pure.
The mixed strategies φ and φ∗ differ only over the set {µ = τ} ∩
(A1 ∪A2). Since over this set the payoff in Γ
∗ is w provided the game
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terminates after time τ , whatever the players play, φ is an ε-optimal mixed
strategy in Γ∗.
Let ν be an arbitrary pure strategy of player 2. Define a partition
(B0, B1, B2) of [0, 1] × Ω by
B0 = {µ+ δ < τ} ∪ {ν < τ},
B1 = {µ < τ < µ+ δ} ∩ {ν ≥ τ}, and
B2 = ({µ = τ or µ = +∞}) ∩ {ν ≥ τ}.
Over B0 the game terminates before time τ under (φ, ν). In particular,
γΓ(φ, ν;B0) = γΓ∗(φ, ν;B0). (7)
By (C2) λ⊗ P (B1) < ε/M , so that
γΓ(φ, ν;B1) ≥ γΓ∗(φ, ν;B1)− 2ε. (8)
Over B2 ∩A0 the game never terminates under (φ, ν), so that
γΓ(φ, ν;B2 ∩A0) = γΓ∗(φ, ν;B2 ∩A0) = 0. (9)
Over A1 ∪A2, min{aτ , cτ} ≥ w, so that
γΓ(φ, ν;B2 ∩ (A1 ∪A2)) = Eλ⊗P [1B2∩(A1∪A2)(aτ1{τ<ν} + cτ1{τ=ν})]
≥ Eλ⊗P [w1{τ≤ν}∩B2∩(A1∪A2)] (10)
= γΓ∗(φ, ν;B2 ∩ (A1 ∪A2)).
Finally, since λ ⊗ P ({µ + rδ = ν}) = 0, by Corollary 9, since (ct)t≥0 is
progressively measurable, and since aτ ≥ bτ = w over A3,
γΓ(φ, ν;B2 ∩A3) = Eλ⊗P [1B2∩A3(aµ+rδ1{µ+rδ<ν} + bν1{µ+rδ>ν} + cν1{µ+rδ=ν})]
= Eλ⊗P [1B2∩A3(aµ+rδ1{µ+rδ<ν} + bν1{µ+rδ>ν})]
≥ Eλ⊗P [1B2∩A3(aτ1{µ+rδ<ν} + bτ1{µ+rδ>ν})]− 4ε (11)
≥ Eλ⊗P [w1B2∩A3 ]− 4ε
= γΓ∗(φ, ν;B2 ∩A3).
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Summing Eqs. (7)-(11), and using the ε-optimality of φ∗ in Γ∗, gives us
V − ε ≤ γΓ∗(φ, ν) ≤ γΓ(φ, ν) + 6ε,
as desired.
4 Extensions
In the present section we construct specific ε-optimal strategies in the spirit
of Dynkin (1969) or Rosenberg et al. (2001), and we give conditions for the
existence of the value in pure strategies. We then provide two extensions to
the basic model.
4.1 Construction of an ε-optimal strategy
Let Γ = (Ω,A, P, (Ft)t≥0, (at, bt, ct)t≥0) satisfy the conditions of Theorem 7.
Define τ, (A0, A1, A2, A3), w and Γ
∗ = (Ω,A, P, (Ft)t≥0, (a
∗
t , b
∗
t , c
∗
t )t≥0)
as in the proof of Theorem 7.
For any stopping time σ let Γ∗σ = (Ω,A, P, (Ft)t≥0, (a
∗
t , b
∗
t , c
∗
t )t≥0) be the
game starting at time σ; that is, players are restricted to choose strategies
that stop with probability 1 at or after time σ.
Lepeltier and Mainguenau (1984, Theorem 13) and Proposition 11 show
that this game has a value in mixed strategies X∗σ. Moreover, the value is
independent of (c∗t )t≥0.
Using a general result of Dellacherie and Lenglart (1982), Lepeltier and
Mainguenau (1984, Theorem 7) show the existence of a right-continuous
process (V ∗t )t≥0 such that V
∗
σ = X
∗
σ for every stopping time σ.
For every ǫ > 0 define a stopping time
µ∗ε = inf
{
t ≥ 0 : V ∗t ≤ a
∗
t +
ε
35
}
.
By definition of τ and Γ∗, one has µ∗ε ≤ τ.
Lepeltier and Mainguenau (1984, Theorem 13) and Proposition 11 imply
that µ∗ε is
ε
35 -optimal for Player 1 in any game Γ˜ = (Ω,A, P, (Ft)t≥0, (a
∗
t , b
∗
t , dt)t≥0),
where (dt)t≥0 is any process satisfying a
∗
t ≤ dt ≤ b
∗
t for any t ≥ 0.
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Let δ be such that P ({|at−aµ∗ε | <
ε
35 , ∀t ∈ [µ
∗
ε, µ
∗
ε+ δ]}) > 1−
ε
35 . From
the proof of Proposition 11 we deduce that µ∗ε + rδ is
ε
7 -optimal for player
1 in Γ∗.
Now, assume that δ is sufficiently small so that
• P ({µ∗ε + δ < τ}) ≥ P ({µ
∗
ε < τ})−
ε
7M , and
• P ({|at − aτ | <
ε
7 , |bt − bτ | <
ε
7 ∀t ∈ [τ, τ + δ]}) > 1−
ε
7 .
Define a mixed strategy φε as follows.
φε(r, ·) =

µ∗ε + rδ {µ
∗
ε < τ} ∪A0,
τ {µ∗ε = τ} ∩ (A1 ∪A2) ,
µ∗ε + rδ {µ
∗
ε = τ} ∩A3.
The proof of Theorem 7 implies that φε is ε-optimal for player 1 in Γ.
Assume that cτ ≥ bτ a.s. (or, equivalently, that A1 ∪ A2 = Ω). By the
proof of Proposition 11, it is 0-optimal for Player 1 in Γ to stop at time
τ , provided the game reaches time τ . If in addition one has at ≤ ct ≤
bt for every t ∈ [0, τ [, by the proof of Proposition 11 and Lepeltier and
Mainguenau (1984, Theorem 13) we deduce that the pure stopping time
inf {t ≥ 0 : V ∗t ≤ a
∗
t + ε} is ε-optimal for Player 1 in Γ. Hence one obtains
the following.
Proposition 12 If ct ∈ co{at, bt} for every t ∈ [0, τ ] then the value exists in
pure strategies. An ε-optimal strategy for Player 1 is inf {t ≥ 0 : V ∗t ≤ a
∗
t + ε},
and an ε-optimal strategy for Player 2 is inf {t : V ∗t ≥ b
∗
t − ε} .
Corollary 13 Every stopping game such that (at, bt, ct)t≥0 are continuous
and satisfies c0 ∈ co{a0, b0} admits a value in pure strategies.
4.2 On final payoff
Our convention is that the payoff is 0 if no player ever stops. In fact, one
can add a final payoff as follows. Let χ be an A-measurable and integrable
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function. The expected payoff that corresponds to a pair of pure strategies
(µ, ν) is:
EP [aµ1{µ<ν} + bν1{µ>ν} + cµ1{µ=ν<+∞} + χ1{µ=ν=+∞}].
The expected payoff can be written as:
EP [χ] +EP
[(
aµ −E
Fµ
P
[
χ
])
1{µ<ν} +
(
bν −E
Fν
P [χ]
)
1{µ>ν}
+
(
cµ −E
Fµ
P [χ]
)
1{µ=ν<+∞}
]
,
where E
Fµ
P [χ] is the conditional expectation of χ given the σ-algebra Fµ.
Define a process dt := E
Ft
P [χ] . Since the filtration satisfies the “usual
conditions”, (dt)t≥0 is a right-continuous martingale (see, e.g., Dellacherie
and Meyer, 1980, §VI-4). Hence we are reduced to the study of the standard
stopping game Γ∗ = (Ω,A, P, (Ft)t≥0, (a
∗
t , b
∗
t , c
∗
t )t≥0) with a
∗
t = bt − dt, b
∗
t =
bt − dt and c
∗
t = ct − dt.
4.3 On cumulative payoff
In our definition, players receive no payoff before the game stops. One can
add a cumulative payoff as follows. Let (xt)t≥0 be a progressively measurable
process satisfying EP
[∫ +∞
0 |xt| dt
]
< +∞, and suppose that the expected
payoff that corresponds to a pair of pure strategies (µ, ν) is given by
EP
[
aµ1{µ<ν} + bν1{µ>ν} + cµ1{µ=ν<+∞} +
∫ min{µ,ν}
0
xtdt
]
.
The expected payoff can be written as
EP
[(
aµ +
∫ µ
0
xtdt
)
1{µ<ν} +
(
bν +
∫ ν
0
xtdt
)
1{µ>ν}
+
(
cµ +
∫ µ
0
xtdt
)
1{µ=ν<+∞}
]
+EP
[
1{µ=ν=+∞} ×
∫ ∞
0
xtdt
]
.
Thus, the game is equivalent to the stopping game Γ∗ = (Ω,A, P, (Ft)t≥0, (a
∗
t , b
∗
t , c
∗
t )t≥0)
with terminal payoff χ =
∫∞
0 xtdt, where a
∗
t = at+
∫ t
0 xsds, b
∗
t = bt+
∫ t
0 xsds,
and c∗t = ct +
∫ t
0 xsds.
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